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Between Philosophy and Art: A Collaboration at The Lock-Up, Newcastle1 
 
ABSTRACT 
At The Lock-Up in Newcastle one weekend in September 2015, a group of artists, musicians 
and performers, performed to an audience which included philosopher commentators. The 
idea was to look for points of intersection, interface or divergence between art and 
philosophy. However, what we found was that the commentators were not engaged in 
analysing what was simply given them, but instead actively constructing the meaning they 
would ascribe to the work. As such they were co-creators. The objective of this report of the 
event is to establish a basis for more collaboration between art and philosophy in the future 
on the assumption that interdisciplinarity reveals possibilities and perspectives masked by 
the general insularity of well-established disciplines.2 
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Introduction 
Similarity and difference, patterns of variation, consistency and coherence: these are the 
reference points of the philosopher. Understanding experience, exploring ideas through 
particular instantiations, novel and innovative thinking: these are the reference points of the 
artist.  However, at certain points in the proceedings of our Symposium titled, Next to 
Nothing: Art as Performance, this characterisation of philosopher and artist respectively 
might have been construed the other way around.  The commentator/philosophers 
referenced their philosophical interests through the particular examples/instantiations 
created by the artist and in virtue of which they were then able to engage with novel and 
2 
 
innovative thinking.  From the artists’ presentations, on the other hand, emerged a series of 
contrasts within which philosophical and artistic ideas resonated.  This interface of 
philosopher-artist bore witness to the fact that just as art approaches philosophy in 
providing its own analysis, philosophy approaches art in being a co-creator of art’s meaning.  
In what follows, we discuss the conception of philosophy-art that emerged from the 
Symposium, and the methodological minimalism which we employed in order to achieve it.  
We conclude by drawing out an implication of the Symposium’s achievement which is that a 
counterpoint to Institutional theories of art may well be the point from which future 
directions will take hold, if philosophy-art gains traction. 
 
[Image 1 inserted here] 
 
Philosophy as Art and Aesthetic Ideas 
The echoes of Samuel Beckett and Marcel Duchamp in the title of this Symposium reveal the 
aspiration of its curators, Jennifer McMahon and Sean Lowry, to explore the limits of artistic 
meaningfulness in a context that questions or blurs the distinction between art and the 
philosophy of art – although what we are to understand as ‘philosophy of art’ was itself 
called into question. Philosophy of art is standardly conceived as an analysis of art as though 
art is something simply given as an object fully formed in every sense and awaits analysis. 
However, at this event there was a notable shift in our conception of art, from art-as-object 
to art-as-action; and a subsequent shift in our conception of philosophy of art, from mere 
analysis of artwork, to co-creation of its meaning.  This is not a new idea, having been 
explored by the contemporary American philosopher Stanley Cavell (2002) but it is an idea 
that has not managed to infiltrate the consciousness of philosophers of art in the Anglo-
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American tradition who persist in treating their work as analysis, as if meaning were 
discovered rather than created (see Abell 2012, Carlson 2008, Davies 2006). In this paper 
the performative nature of the commentaries and the way they were edited and augmented 
through discussion with artists, will be referred to as philosophy-art to distinguish it from 
the philosophy of art. 
The recognition that philosophy-art contributes to the meaning of art rather than 
engages in analysing what is simply given by the artwork can be given an even older 
pedigree in what for theorists of popular culture would be a rather unexpected source, the 
aesthetic theory of Immanuel Kant (2000). Popular culture studies sit at a juncture between 
criticism of the capitalist ideology represented within products of the culture industry, on 
the one hand, and studies that aim to understand popular culture as a site for the creativity 
of individuals and the creation of cultural identities and communities, on the other. The 
study of popular culture emerged as a response to what were considered elitist attacks on 
the arts of the masses from  critical theorists within the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer  and 
Adorno 1944), who thought the culture industry complicit in the continuation of capitalism 
by creating diversions that encouraged people to be passive within the system. For example, 
Pierre Bourdieu (1984) argued that the concept of taste was developed to uphold a concept 
of high culture that was intended to reinforce class distinctions. Kant’s aesthetic theory was 
often inadvertently caricatured in support of those defending a concept of high culture (see 
McMahon 2016). 
Bourdieu’s influential work on the development of aesthetic judgement, which 
associated aesthetic appreciation with a process through which an elite marked its identity 
and separated itself from popular culture, was central to the process of marginalisation of 
aesthetics within the field. In the process, philosophical aesthetics and in particular, a 
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distorted version of Kant’s conception of the beautiful based on a reading of only the first 
half of the Critique of Judgment, became associated with the concept of a ‘pure aesthetic’ 
which was mistakenly interpreted as providing an objective account of beauty whose 
principles were only accessible to those with refined or upper class taste (Bourdieu 1987). 
Within the various approaches to the study of popular culture, emphasis has been placed on 
a method of description (as opposed to evaluation) in order to avoid the relativism of values 
(Madden 1973) and this was seen as an alternative to the aesthetics of culture. Nonetheless, 
sporadic attempts were made to develop an aesthetics of popular culture throughout the 
1980s and 90s (see Coleman 1985; Fluck 1988; Ruesga 1996). However, this project remains 
unrealised. 
Recent research indicates that the notion of an aesthetics of popular culture was 
never made entirely redundant. For example, aesthetic evaluations of the films of the 1980s 
were based on specific theories of art (Nelson 2013) and furthermore, the term ‘aesthetic’ 
operates within a discourse of legitimation for emerging art forms such as video games and 
fan fiction (Flegel and Roth 2014). Yet, within contemporary focuses on the active audience 
and their creativity, there remains a need to account for producers’ choices. Without this, 
an aesthetics of popular culture remains an aesthetics of reception. For example, Henry 
Jenkin’s (2006) provides an account of fan communities as ‘prosumers’ (producers and 
consumers) of popular culture and folk art, without addressing the role of the artist or 
producer. One way to address both the role of producer and ‘prosumer’ is through a study 
of imagination, a process the study of which is back in vogue within philosophy (see 
Crowther 2015, Langland-Hassan 2011, Nanay 2016). Imagination by these accounts is 
central to the process of artistic creation and reception. However, even the most recent 
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accounts of imagination once applied to the processes of artistic creation and reception can 
be seen to have their origins in Kant’s account of aesthetic ideas. 
Aesthetic ideas, according to Kant, are ideas which go beyond the concept we have of 
an object and draw together fragments, nuances, traces and impressions which may not 
have been experienced before within the same mental frame. As such, aesthetic ideas 
further understanding in some way and can be prompted by nature and artworks.  Kant 
provides a way of articulating this process (including the meaning that is created in 
reception) but he emphasised that the expression of aesthetic ideas are acculturating 
because in attempting to make one’s aesthetic ideas understood by others, one 
inadvertently calibrates the terms of reference one employs in one’s private experience 
with those of one’s community. This suggests that the expression of aesthetic ideas is both 
what the artist does in making art and also what the audience does in interpreting it. In this 
symposium we witnessed philosophy-art in terms of this very process. 
 
[Image 2 inserted here] 
 
Among the works performed were Steve Dutton’s ontologically unstable art-forms 
hovering between image and text. Dutton occupied the main gallery of The Lock-Up, ran 
workshops prior to the weekend of the Symposium with Postgraduate students from the 
University of Newcastle, and delivered a key-note address at the Symposium. He 
demonstrated, performed and explained through these various modes the way the content 
of art is neither idiosyncratic impression nor explicit concept but somewhere in-between. 
His point of department was the space between image and text.  This was so very nicely 
encapsulated by Braddon Snape’s exploration of the imagination of disaster, the sublime 
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thrill involved in inflating a large shiny steel balloon in a small enclosed space, every pop and 
buckle of the beautiful metal pillow a potential catastrophe for the all-too-embodied 
viewer. Interestingly, it was a work that evoked all kinds of emotive sounds from those in 
attendance and at some points, frightened gasps. Yet after it was over, everyone showed 
their appreciation with smiles and a generally elevated energy and enthusiasm but no one 
seemed to need to discuss the work as such.  We were more inclined to ask Braddon to 
discuss his artistic trajectory, to understand how he emerged at this point in time with this 
very affecting and absorbing technique. There were many more performances by artists, 
musicians and writers, many from the staff at the University of Newcastle but also including 
independent artists who had answered an EOI.  The possibilities of meaning in all these 
cases emerged from the indeterminacy of the work; that is, a kind of open-ended 
suggestiveness entertained in a purposeful way. The mental frameworks we entertained 
during the Symposium were co-created by the artists’ performances and the ensuing 
discussions. 
Cavell, the American philosopher mentioned earlier, apparently warned his students: 
‘Remember it is philosophy you are studying, exactly the subject whose problems must not 
be taken as given, as if their importance is assured, the discipline whose very existence, and 
importance are to be held at risk’ (1986: 171-177). Philosophy, like art, is an exploration of 
one’s way of seeing things, and as such, is an intimate engagement with one’s imaginative 
vision and understanding, the depths of one’s entire sensibility. As artist Fay Neilson’s 
reflections on the work of Michaela Gleave made vivid, in suffering the endless repetitions 
of time, artists and philosophers are attempting to make the ordinary extraordinary.  And 
yet, one can argue that as Beckett puts it, ‘To be an artist is to fail as no other dare fail’ 
(1987, 125), that is, as art and philosophy essentially fail because they aim to articulate that 
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aspect of experience that eludes articulation.  However, this failure, if we agree to construe 
it as failure, can be productive. It makes possible an ever-evolving sense of things, an ever-
evolving understanding of experience.  This was Kant’s point when he argued that the 
expression of aesthetic ideas was a furthering of life without which culture was impossible. 
In this Symposium we treated the blurring of the boundaries between philosophy and art as 
an uncovering of what philosophy essentially is rather than a new development of its 
possibilities. 
 
The Symposium and Aesthetic Pleasure 
The achievement of this symposium in bringing the essence of philosophy into view was 
possible due to a number of factors. Bringing artists and philosophers together has 
floundered in the past because the right context and format were not found. In this case, its 
success was possibly due in part to the fact that both philosophers and artists were 
displaced from their usual practice and placed in unfamiliar circumstances. We could say, 
both philosophers and artists ‘performed’ their practice in new contexts. In other words, a 
key to the success of this venture was that both philosophers and artists were pushed 
beyond their comfort zones into a realm where rules, customs and familiar routines did not 
readily apply. We were all outside our usual practice of work and that created the 
conditions for an openness and naivety of response as well as allowing for improvisations 
on/about art/philosophy.  
The artists had responded to a brief which asked them to consider the minimum 
requirements for their creative practice. A key term was ‘performance’. This brought 
together artists working in various modes and prevented the philosophers from settling on 
philosophical assumptions about any particular artform. Another of the reasons the 
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Symposium worked was a methodological decision to focus on minimalism; not in terms of 
the established art discourse around the artistic movement known by that name but in its 
more general sense. We were in a disused exercise yard and at times the presentations 
spread out into gutted police cells. This was neither the minimalism that would like to 
pretend the past never happened – all around us in the Hunter Street Gallery The Lock-Up 
were traces of the ‘minimum’ to which state power for over a century had stripped back the 
lives of those incarcerated there – nor the minimalism that imagines that with the right 
amount of abstraction, philosophy and art could clamber upon a common ground, hit upon 
a common language. That is, the potential of the philosophy-art interface did not emerge 
from consensus. The rich possibilities relied on the opposite. Deceleration more than 
reductionism describes the approach adopted to the weekend by many of the artists 
involved: rather than reaching for a conceptual discourse that risked erasing their art’s 
irreducibility to philosophy, they spelt, acted and laid out the components of their practice 
and thereby gave the audience the time, the space and the chance to inspect them and to 
engage with them.   
 
[Image 3 inserted here] 
 
Julie Vulcan slowly panned the walls of the exercise yard for a live feed in close-up in 
an adjoining cell. The mood in the yard as we watched her intense focus and incremental 
movements along the wall reflected her intensity and calm. Nothing else seemed to matter 
apart from what Julie had before her eyes. The intricate details of the deteriorating scraps 
of paint as they peeled off the heritage listed wall, seemed to take on a significance and 
interest one could not have imagined before Julie’s actions. This performance primed us for 
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the keynote address that followed by Dutton, discussed above. The following day, Kris 
Smith’s demonstration of the potentiality of the photographer’s medium involved 
movement, provided by the audience. We entered a confined space and witnessed the 
effects of our movements on the colours which appeared on the screen; with every move 
changing each colour’s edging into its complementary hue. The sheer dynamism of colour 
and the way the photographer must understand its interplay with light became our focus. 
And Kris directed us through this by sharing his knowledge of the way a photographic image 
for the photographer is always an experiment in the potentiality of light. Later that day we 
focussed on another kind of potential. Deidre Brollo and Deb Mansfield’s game of Chinese 
whispers with volunteers and mobile phones, parodied the unsolvable riddle of art, by 
finding its own path to an enigma. What was heard in whispers seemed more influenced by 
what a hearer already knew than what was said. 
All of the artists who performed during the weekend demonstrated what they could 
do with the bare essentials of their respective arts and the bare essentials of the venue; and 
so did the commentators. There was a minimalism in listening and asking questions on the 
basis of what one has heard, rather than in slotting the presentations into a pre-existing 
theory, or at least we avoided this to the extent that this is possible, given our theoretically 
loaded perceptions. The only constraint was to make oneself understood.  
 
Image 4 inserted here 
 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement touches upon the universalism to which this minimalism might 
aspire in its discussion of the universal voice to which a speaker lays claim in calling 
something beautiful.  The universal voice of the pure aesthetic judgement of free beauty 
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makes its claim unsupported by any appeal to the objective criteria by which we otherwise 
order and evaluate the world around us.  Kant investigates the disinterest invoked by the 
speech act ‘This x is beautiful’ without assuming that the commitments embedded in the 
form of the utterance align with the psychology of the speaker.  The pleasure of the 
beautiful is inexplicable as a merely private affair (why do we say that something is beautiful 
rather than simply ‘I like this’?).  It takes us outside of ourselves.  Kant’s pure aesthetic 
judgement is a judgement whose touchstone is pleasure alone, a pleasure that calls out to 
the pleasure of others without any recognised model to anchor it or any codified criteria 
that might appear to make ‘sense’ of it.  An art that gives itself over to experimentation, 
declining to be appropriated to any set of established measures, turns its back on one 
community to lie in readiness for another whose unexternalisable bond is pleasure.  The 
pleasure cannot be planned for, without compromising aesthetic judgement’s distinctness 
from cognitive judgement.  While understandably philosophy can offer no concrete 
guidance in how art might occasion a pure aesthetic judgement, it can in its own wariness 
towards positivism help foster vigilance in which experimentation – and the pleasure to 
which it can give rise – receives its due politically as an agent of community. 
 
Counterpoint to Institutional Theories of Art: aesthetic ideas, pleasure and semiotics 
When artists research a new work, project or just look for ideas, the process can take a 
myriad of forms and encompass any and all ‘things’, materials and approaches. The primary 
output for artists is some kind of idea or expression which may or may not have material or 
conceptual form. This seems open ended, amorphous and problematic, partly because it 
implies ‘anything can be art’ (see de Duve 2014). For many artists however, in the right 
context, or with framing, or maybe with intention, anything might be considered art. A 
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question related to those raised earlier emerges regarding how one comes to know the 
difference.  
One way to approach this question is by experiencing the way artists exercise 
judgment in their practice. Working seemingly beyond rules or formula, the work presented 
at this Symposium was nonetheless communicative, rather than idiosyncratic. While the 
artist/performers welcomed all manner of interpretations, there was still the possibility that 
someone could get them just plain wrong. It was as if the artists were guided by a rule but a 
rule that could not be articulated, or not discursively. Perhaps we might refer to it as a 
visual, musical or performative idea, metaphor or trope. The artist approached her work 
guided by the idea/construct but not with a predetermined outcome in mind. The outcomes 
that eventuated were not forced but emerged from the artist’s interactions with 
media/experiments. The process appeared purposive but without a set, preordained end.  
That is, we had to see and hear what the interactions yielded before we could glimpse an 
outcome. The basis of this process is what Dutton had called the mid-point, as discussed 
above, and it is at the very heart of what philosophers call aesthetic reflective judgment: 
that what is engaged with, in engaging with art, is neither fully formed concept, nor 
idiosyncratic impressions, but something in-between. 
According to the institutional theory of art, something can become art only within an 
institutional context (Dickie 1969, Danto 1964, Bourdieu, 1987) for this very reason. The 
institution gives the work the conventional basis from which meaning can be ascribed. 
However, the art presented in this Symposium, reaffirmed the value of art as a source of 
communication by not only exploiting cultural reference points but also exploiting the 
affordances provided by materiality. In many cases, the artist’s ‘minimal’ performance was 
created through engagement with the sensory qualities of a material or environment, the 
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social or cultural codes that might be associated with those qualities, and the extended 
connotations of those codes. These elements enabled the artists to create work that was 
meaningful for the audience. This approach resonates not simply relative to a western 
institution of art, but as a practice found across all cultures, a fact that is particularly evident 
where the basis of one’s experience is both the process of creation and the context of 
reception. In an influential account of this expressive process for use in anthropological 
studies, George Mills argued that ‘art is the creation, by manipulating a medium, of public 
objects or events that serve as deliberately organized sets of conditions for experience in 
qualitative mode’ (1971, p. 95). Qualitative experiences, according to Mills, are a result of 
presentation, suggestion and structure. Materials of creation, such as paint and sound, 
arouse sensations that have qualities. Mills construes qualities like shiny or dull surfaces, 
mellow or sharp sounds, fast or slow movements and monumental, swirling or chaotic 
structures as metaphoric in themselves, that is, without institutional context. This possibility 
informed the minimalism of the Symposium. While the artists pushed this into more 
theoretically informed spaces, nonetheless, the semiotics of qualitative experience was to 
the fore. 
For artist Honi Ryan performing could be a decision or intention. She drew attention 
to this possibility by distinguishing one moment from another in creatively relevant ways. 
One way to make sense of this is to understand art as research, as each artist like Ryan 
worked with a material which in her case was her own body in movement. In other words, 
artistic process involved a material investigation. The properties of these materials might be 
assessed for their tactile, haptic or sensuous values alongside the semiotic, symbolic or 
metaphorical presence they embodied. For example, musician Richard Kean explored the 
sounds of a single stringed bow. It might be perceived as a functioning musical instrument, a 
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musical teacher’s tool, an alerting device or a toy. But it might also be employed to stand as 
a prop - a stand-in for the idea of musical creation. Furthermore, it might be intended as a 
metaphor for simplicity of expression or a finely tuned performance of art or life. 
The success or failure of a form’s ability to occupy metaphorical and semiotic status is 
in the hands of the artist and their task would seem to involve finding complicated signifiers 
to engage their audience in the appropriate experience and reflection. Some artists of 
course opt to work primarily with ideas, but at this Symposium each artist brought material 
into the arena of their work, even when it was their own body. Ryan’s work mentioned 
above, involved transforming at will her act of walking along a street into an artwork. Art, 
when understood in terms of research, does not define it as a specific kind of product 
produced for a gallery. On the contrary, Ryan’s art was produced outside this context, 
emphasising the continuities between our daily ‘non-artistic’ lives, popular culture and fine 
art.  Nonetheless, fine art might be thought of as a meta-narrative that throws the qualities 
and connotations of the everyday into relief, and Ryan’s work certainly achieved this. 
 
[Image 5 inserted here] 
 
The semiotics of materiality addresses the space between image and text, and a 
performance rich in metaphoric references was that of Emily Parsons-Lord. The 
connotations and values associated with sensory qualities as demonstrated in the 
discussions surrounding her performance were very affecting, yet not private nor personal 
to any individual. Her work relied on a code of semiotics that enabled her to exploit 
metaphors and associations that the audience would recognise. Her performance entitled, 
‘You will always be wanted by me’, explored the act of naming stars and ‘dedicating’ them 
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to loved ones. She represented each star by mimicking perceived properties of its chemical 
structure in a smoke bomb, each combination creating distinct combinations of colours. She 
interwove these explosions of colour and smoke with explanations of astronomy and the 
narratives of the names they were given. The names were remarkable such as: ‘The only lie I 
ever told “I never loved you” ’; ‘Remember me exactly this way’; and ‘I am so so so so sorry 
Katherine’. As audience members we were invited to participate in the collective 
imagination of the galaxy as described through astronomy, colonialism and the social, 
emotive associations of stars, and we accepted. This interplay between the physical and 
ephemeral, the sublime and trite romanticism, sincerity and commercialism could only 
make sense within a communicative structure in which we collectively participated. The 
anthropological view of a connection between the values and connotations of sensory 
impressions in everyday life and art is the opposite of Jean Baudrillard’s discussion of the 
postmodern condition.  According to Baudrillard, the once separated domains of economy, 
art, politics and sexuality collapse into one another (1993).  However, Parsons-Lord’s work 
denies that these domains were ever autonomous. The semiotic code is why art may 
‘comment’, so devastatingly at times, so beautifully at others, on life. 
The semiotic code also speaks to our capacity to imagine. When we imagine we do not 
leave our particular experience, knowledge and training behind. That is, we do not enter an 
artworld bubble. Certain examples brought this home such as artist Miranda Lawry’s finely 
tuned documentations of the bizarre practices currently driving hospital design in the region 
where our Symposium took place. The work got under our skin because it explored the 
themes from within, using imagery, personal stories and anecdotes, beautifully calibrated 
into a work presented as hard-bound books. A community based hospital where surgeons 
out surfing knew when their shift was to begin when their beach towel was hung from a 
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windowsill, is just one of the delightful examples we were given of what was replaced by a 
new state of the art building whose medical staff were confined to windowless spaces for 
their downtime; as though the way to boost patient morale had nothing to do with the 
moral of the medical staff. 
The contrast between Lawry’s topic and that of literary theorist Alexandra Dry did not 
faze the audience. Dry’s team of actors performed an ancient play by the early modern 
playwright Jane Lumley, whose purpose and conditions of creation were unknown. We 
imagined all kinds of things and enjoyed the performance on many levels. One line of 
inquiry, given the play’s theme involved a woman being condemned to death by her father 
who was a high ranking official at the time, and the fact it was an interpretation by a woman 
of an earlier play, led to reflection on the way semiotic systems can privilege the ruling or 
dominant class within a society and limit the creative potential of minorities as they 
determine how a work is framed and received. In our own interpretations of the play, and 
the interpretation of the earlier play by the playwright, what was on display was the degree 
to which our imaginations are embedded within our own experiences. Our imaginations 
might be free to choose topics, themes, methods and associated practices but our 
understanding of those choices is limited to our cognitive heritage.  Lumley made creative 
choices and we imagined what her choices might have meant. 
Over lunch the commentators argued about whether an unperformed play, as this 
apparently had been, can be rightfully considered a play. This made a difference to the way 
we thought about what we had witnessed, its significance. Yet it was now a play that had 
been performed, at least in part. We had been witness to an ontological conversion: the text 
had not changed, but its significance had, that it was meant to be experienced as spoken 
within a dramatic context, with all the connotations and innuendo that any context would 
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provide.  This concern draws attention to what imagination can do if not create from 
nothing.  We re-construe, reprioritise and reconfigure; and the work presented could be 
said to have prompted our imaginative engagement in this respect. 
The musician Linda Walsh paraphrased Gaston Bachelard on imagination, where he 
muses that imagination consists of being freed from reality, a powerful idea for inspiring 
work like her own. We saw a video clip of her playing the oboe, where the sounds were 
electronically tuned into a digitally generated water display which reverberated with her 
playing.  The theme relied on our willingness to find pleasure in the moment but our 
engagement was not freed from reality in as much as imagination necessarily draws upon 
our past experience, knowledge and training.  Nonetheless, what works as a guide in 
creation is justified in that respect alone regardless of whether it stands analytic scrutiny. In 
any case, her work might well have prompted a new synthesis of our memory traces, a 
going beyond the concepts we have at our disposal and in this once again, Kant’s doctrine of 
aesthetic ideas has explanatory power. 
Philip Matthias’ presentation of his collaboration with the Murray Island musicians 
and composers might also be considered in this light. Some audience members objected to 
a white woman singing a sweet lullaby composed by an indigenous person. The 
overpowering sense had been that the music and singing were beautiful; but the onus 
shifted now to those who privileged the pleasures of the imagination to justify their stance 
in the face of political considerations. Yet aesthetic pleasure may be more than something 
to exploit for one’s ends. It may be something to open one to new perspectives (Kneller, 
1998; McMahon, 2014). In other words, this may be another demonstration which denies 
that the various domains of culture such as economy, art, politics and sexuality were ever 
autonomous, contra Baudrillard (1993); and that the un-codifiability of aesthetic pleasure 
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among those who share it, creates the conditions for a new community. To deny the 
political potential of aesthetic pleasure is to close off an avenue remaining for cultural 
renewal. 
 
[Image 6 inserted here] 
 
Conclusion 
The success of a symposium is always a matter of unfinished business, for it must go only so 
far in living up to its name in bringing people together.  But the genuine spirit of cooperation 
which prevailed over the weekend produced something which it is difficult to record but left 
us all feeling a very constructive basis for further collaboration had been established. To 
come together means not to be a prisoner of one’s practices and habits; but it also means 
that the community in whose horizon we exist has not yet taken shape, that it is a work in 
progress, that indeed it can only ever be a work in progress if it is not to congeal into a 
dogma, a nationalism, a jargon.  As discussed earlier, “pleasure” understood in the Kantian 
sense, provides the anchor which defies codification. Philosophy-art gives itself over to 
experimentation as co-creator of the meaning ascribed to art, both in the general sense of 
the word and also regarding particular instances of art. In doing so, philosophy-art turns its 
back on one community, but establishes the conditions for a new one, one made possible by 
our capacity for the open-ended indeterminacy of the objects of aesthetic pleasure.3 
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